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This paper studies the evolution of individual earnings inequality and dynamics in Canada from
1983 to 2016 using tax files and administrative records. Linking these individuals to their employers
(and rich administrative records on firms) beginning in 2001, it also documents the relationship between
the earnings dynamics of workers and the size and growth of their employers. It highlights three main
patterns over this period: First, with a few exceptions (sharp increase in top 1% and declining gender
gap), Canada has experienced relatively modest changes in overall earnings inequality, volatility, and
mobility between 1983 and 2016. Second, there is considerable variability in earnings inequality and
volatility over the business cycle. Third, the earnings dynamics of individuals are strongly related to the
size and employment growth of their employers.
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1 Introduction
The rising inequality observed in many developed countries over the past several decades has garnered
considerable attention. Changes in earnings inequality may signal structural transformations in the tech-
nology of production (as highlighted in the voluminous literatures on skill-biased technological change or
polarization), shifts in the nature of international trade, evolving labor market institutions, or the influence of
new economic policies and their incentives for work. Because the persistence of earnings differences across
individuals is critical for understanding the implications of inequality for individual welfare, the evolution
of earnings volatility and mobility are also of great interest. In this paper, we study the evolution of earnings
inequality, volatility, and mobility in Canada from 1983 to 2016. We also study the extent to which the
earnings dynamics of workers depend on the size and growth of the firms at which they work.
Most studies of Canadian earnings inequality rely on Census data or survey data like the Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF), Labour Force Survey (LFS), or Survey of Labour and IncomeDynamics (SLID).1
These studies generally find modest long-term changes in inequality relative to the substantial increases
observed in the U.S. (e.g., see the survey in Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Morissette and Berube (1996)
and Baker and Solon (2003) provide early studies of earnings mobility and dynamics in Canada using a
1% random sample of tax records from 1975 to 1993. Both studies document considerable persistence in
earnings over the lifecycle, with Baker and Solon (2003) further showing that the variance of both transitory
and persistent components increased over their sample period. Studying Canadian income mobility over
more recent decades (using both survey and administrative data), several studies have documented increasing
mobility with the duration between periods, although these studies continue to find considerable persistence
in the tails of the earnings distribution (Beach and Finnie, 1998, 2004; Bowlus and Robin, 2012; Lammam,
Karabegović, and Veldhuis, 2012). We are unaware of any Canadian studies focusing on the relationship
between the earnings dynamics of workers and the employment or productivity dynamics of their firms;
however, Gee, Liu, and Rosell (2020) highlight the important role of firms in explaining cross-sectional
earnings inequality in Canada. We discuss these studies, as well as several others, further below.
Like other articles in this issue, we exploit several administrative and tax files. These records allow us
to observe annual earnings for all Canadians who file income taxes in every year that they file from 1983 to
2016. Beginning in 2001, we are also able to link these individuals to their employers (and corresponding
firm records), facilitating our analysis of joint worker and firm dynamics.
Our analysis provides a vast array of evidence on the evolution of earnings inequality and dynamics
in Canada over the last four decades, all using the same data source, sampling scheme, and measures of
earnings (with the sampling and measurement designed to facilitate comparisons with the studies focused
on other countries in this issue). We let the data speak for themselves as much as possible. Here, we briefly
1For example, see Beaudry and Green (2000); Picot (2001); Boudarbat, Lemieux, and Riddell (2010); Brzozowski et al. (2010);
Fortin et al. (2012); Beach (2016); Fortin and Lemieux (2015); and Green and Sand (2015). See Frenette, Green, and Picot (2006)
for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these data sources, and a comparison of family income inequality across them.
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highlight three broad sets of findings.
First, with a few notable exceptions, we find onlymodest changes in standardmeasures of overall earnings
inequality, volatility, and mobility between 1983 and 2016. For example, the earnings for men at the 90th
percentile relative to 10th percentile increased by roughly 13%, while this ratio declined by about 8% for
women. This experience is quite different from the large increases in inequality documented in the U.S. (e.g.,
see the survey in Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Canadian measures of annual or 5-year earnings volatility,
as well as earnings mobility over more extended periods, also show little long-term trend. Based on these
summary measures, one could be forgiven for thinking that nothing has changed in the Canadian labor market
since the early 1980s, but this is not quite true. The earnings of women have risen substantially relative to
men (by roughly 30% at the median), and there has been a meteoric rise in earnings among those at the
very top of the earnings distribution, as also documented by Saez and Veall (2005) and Veall (2012). More
broadly, inequality increased somewhat over the top half of the earnings distribution, while it declined over
the bottom half, resulting in modest changes overall. Although mobility patterns have remained remarkably
stable over most of the earnings distribution, there was a shift toward less persistence in the middle of the
distribution toward slightly more downward mobility from 1985 to 2005. Interestingly, this is coupled with
sustained persistence at the top and bottom of the distribution.
Second, we find that despite relative stability of earnings inequality and volatility over the long-term,
there is considerable variability over the business cycle. The major recession of the early 1990s and, to a
lesser extent, the Great Recession of 2008–09 induced sharp (temporary) increases in earnings inequality and
volatility, driven mainly by significant earnings losses by men at the bottom of the earnings distribution and
younger workers. However, those at the very top of the earnings distribution (i.e., top 1%) also experienced
heavy losses during these downturns.
Third, we show that the earnings dynamics of workers are strongly related to the size and employment
growth of their employers. Most interestingly, we find that workers at fast-growing firms experience faster
earnings growth and less downside risk than workers at rapidly shrinking firms, who experience low (or
negative) average earnings growth and little upside risk. Meanwhile, workers at firmswith stable employment
typically experience moderate earnings growth with little upside or downside risk. Our results further reveal
that the positive relationship between workers’ average earnings growth and their firms’ employment growth
is broad-based, evident for those with high and low recent earnings levels, those at large and small firms, and
those at young and old firms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our main source of data, sampling, and
variable definitions, while Section 3 provides a very brief overview of the economic and policy environment
in Canada over the period we study. Our empirical analysis is contained in Sections 4 and 5. The former
contains our individual-level analysis of earnings inequality, volatility, and mobility, while the latter contains
our analysis of the joint dynamics of worker earnings and firm employment. Section 6 concludes.
2
2 Data
We use the Canadian Employer–Employee Dynamics Database (CEEDD) for the analysis in this paper. The
CEEDD is a linkable environment developed by Statistics Canada that consists of several administrative and
tax files, including individual tax files (T1 General – Income Tax and Benefit Return), individual employment
remuneration files (T4 Statement of Remuneration Paid), individual records of employment (Record of
Employment (ROE)), the Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB), corporation tax files (T2 Corporation
Income Tax Return), and unincorporated business tax files (T1 Business Declarations). Altogether, it
provides rich information on individual demographics, employment, job mobility, self-employment and
entrepreneurship, and firm characteristics.
The individual part of the CEEDD, which goes back to the early 1980s, enables a long-term analysis of
income inequality and dynamics. It contains information on demographics (year of birth, gender, marital
status, province or territory of residence) and income (employment income, self-employment income, pension
income, investment income, government transfers, etc.); however, information on educational attainment and
occupation is unavailable.
The individual-level data are drawn from the T1 Personal Master File (T1PMF), which contains annual
personal income tax records for all Canadian tax filers who filed their tax returns before a specified cut-off
date. While the exact cut-off date varies over time, it is usually sometime in December one year after the
tax reference year (Messacar, 2017). Only about 3.5–4.8% of all tax filers do not file tax returns before this
date.2 These late filers are not included in T1PMF; however, they are included in the T1 Historical Personal
Master File (T1HPMF), which is more comprehensive than T1PMF, but less timely.
We use the T1PMF (rather than T1HPMF), because it covers a more recent and longer time period.
At the time this analysis was conducted, T1PMF covered the period 1983–2016, while T1HPMF only
covered 1987–2014. Importantly, the exclusion of late filers does not appear to distort measures of the
income distribution. While Messacar (2017) finds that late tax filers tend to be more prevalent among young
individuals, non-residents, emigrants, very low earners, and those with final tax balances close to zero, this
has little effect on estimated earnings distributions, including top-earnings percentiles.3 Over our sample
period (1983–2016), the T1PMF includes records each year for 90–94% of all 25- to 55-year-old Canadians
(Appendix Figure A1).
A standard concernwhen studying inequality based on tax records is the potential for non-filing, especially
among very low earners. Fortunately, as discussed by Frenette, Green, and Picot (2006), even zero-earners
in Canada have had a strong incentive to file their taxes after the 1993 introduction of the refundable Child
2The cut-off date before which a tax return may be included in T1PMF differs from the date by which an individual must submit a
return to the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) or after which interest charges or penalties begin to accrue on outstanding tax balances
owed. The latter date is typically April 30 in Canada.
3Regarding top-earnings percentiles, Messacar (2017) finds little difference when late filers are included or excluded from the
analysis. For example, in 2010, he finds differences of only $200 and $2,550 at the 99th and 99.9th percentiles of employment
income, respectively. He also finds that the likelihood of delayed tax filing is only weakly correlated with changes in individual
circumstances (e.g., changes in employment earnings or receiving unemployment benefits).
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Tax Benefit (and the earlier introduction of the Goods and Services Tax Credit in 1989–1990). Despite
these increased incentives to file, Appendix Figure A1 shows that coverage rates for the T1PMF increased by
only about 2% between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s (peaking at roughly 94%).4 The modest year-to-year
changes in observed filing behavior are unlikely to have any notable impacts on the evolution of broad
measures of inequality during our sample period. Indeed, we observe no unusual changes at the low end of
the earnings distribution between 1992 and 1993, when (and where) filing incentives increased the most.5
2.1 Sample selection and earnings measures
Our analysis focuses on annual individual earnings as measured by the sum of employment income (wages,
salaries, and commissions) reported on T4 slips from all jobs and other taxable receipts from employment
(e.g., tips, gratuities, or director’s fees) that are not reported on T4 slips. Self-employment income is not
considered. All earnings from 1983 to 2016 are denominated in 2018 Canadian dollars using the Canadian
Consumer Price Index. Denote these earnings for individual 8 in year C by H̃8,C .
To ensure cross-country comparability and to reduce the impact of school-to-work transitions and
retirement on earnings dynamics, our analysis only uses earnings observations for individuals when they
are ages 25–55. Even within these ages, not everyone appears in the data every year. Individuals may file
late, or they may not file taxes at all during a year in which they have little or no income. Some individuals
may be out of the country. Due to high rates of immigration to and emigration out of Canada, we omit (or
leave as missing) any earnings measures that are missing before the first year someone is observed filing
their taxes or any earnings measures after the last year they are observed filing; otherwise, we treat any
missing earnings observations (i.e., in-between years with non-missing earnings) as zeros (i.e., set H̃8,C = 0).6
The latter implicitly assumes that missing observations in the middle of someone’s time series of tax filings
reflect years with no earnings. Although this could be problematic for individuals who simply filed later
than the T1PMF cut-off date, we ultimately trim these and other very low earnings measures in nearly all of
our analysis to minimize the influence of temporary employment and weak labor market attachment.7
We define a minimum earnings threshold in year C, H
C
, as the amount a worker could earn by working
part time (20 hours per week) for a quarter of the year (13 weeks) at the real minimum wage for that year.
Because Canada does not have a federal minimum wage, the imposed minimum wage is assumed to be the
4Based on the T1 Family File, which combines records from the T1PMF and other tax forms, Frenette, Green, and Picot (2006)
report a 1% increase in tax file coverage rates (from 95% to 96%) between 1992 and 1993.
5To the extent that any marginal-filing low earners (from high-filing years) earn less than the minimum earnings trimming
threshold imposed below, they would have no effect on our analysis of annual earnings. To the extent that some of these marginal
filers earn between our minimum threshold and the 10th percentile, any increase in their filing rate would lower the 10th percentile
values. Our figures show no evidence of unusual changes in these low earnings percentiles between 1992 and 1993.
6This approach implicitly assumes that individuals are out of the country prior to their first observed filing year or after their last
observed filing year.
7Recall that, by itself, the exclusion of late filers has little effect on earnings distributions (Messacar, 2017). As discussed next,
our analysis of annual earnings measures trims very low earnings observations, so setting missing observations to zero has no effect
on most of our results. Treatment of missing observations only affects our calculation of “permanent” earnings measures, which
are primarily used in our analysis of earnings mobility. As discussed in Section 4.3, alternative treatments of missing observations
yield nearly identical mobility patterns for permanent earnings.
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lowest among all provincial minimum wages at the time.8 The measure of annual earnings we use in our
empirical analysis, H8,C , equals H̃8,C if H̃8,C > H
C
; otherwise, it is set to missing. In much of our analysis, we
focus on the natural logarithm of this annual earnings measure, log(H8,C ). We also calculate residualized log
earnings Y8,C from regressions of log(H8,C ) on annual age dummies separately by gender and year, thereby
removing average lifecycle effects on earnings. (Note that these residuals are also missing whenever earnings
are below the threshold.)
Some of our analysis focuses on (residual) log earnings growth based on Y8,C . To that end, we construct
annual and 5-year earnings growth: Δ1Y8,C ≡ Y8,C+1 − Y8,C and Δ5Y8,C ≡ Y8,C+2 − Y8,C−3, where the latter is
roughly centered on year C.9
Finally, we calculate two measures of “permanent” earnings to minimize the effects of year-to-year
fluctuations. Our main measure of permanent earnings is designed to focus on the distribution and dynamics
of earnings for individuals with moderate to strong labor market attachment, while we also consider an
alternative measure that facilitates an analysis of long-term earnings mobility that incorporates workers who
may be less attached, including those with very low or zero earnings for multiple years. In both cases, we
begin by calculating %8,C as the average of non-missing earnings over three years (H̃8,C , H̃8,C−1, and H̃8,C−2). Our
main measure reflects this average whenever (i) H̃8,C is non-missing (i.e., all years from first to last observed
filing) and (ii) at least two of the earnings measures are above the earnings threshold for their respective
years; otherwise, this measure is set to missing. The second restriction ensures that this measure is always
positive. Most of our analysis uses residualized permanent earnings, Y%
8,C , after removing lifecycle effects
via regressions of log(%8,C ) on annual age dummies separately by gender and year. Our analysis of long-term
earnings mobility considers an alternative permanent earnings measure that also begins with %8,C , but this
measure requires only one of the three earnings measures to be above the minimum earnings threshold.
Further, it is not adjusted for age, gender, or year effects. We let %̃8,C denote this alternative permanent
earnings measure.
Table 1 provides an overview of our data every five years. Panel A reports the number of observations,
mean and standard deviation of annual earnings for the full sample, share of women, average earnings by
gender, and the age distribution. Panel B reports selected percentiles of the annual earnings distribution for
men and women combined. For cross-country comparison, earnings in this table only are converted to U.S.
dollars using the 2018 exchange rate (after first deflating all values to 2018 dollars). The number of workers
in our sample increases from 8 million to 10.8 million over the 30-year period. The share of female workers
has also increased over time as women have entered the labor market at higher rates. We also see a sizeable
8Appendix Figure A2 shows minimum wages for each Canadian province over time, with the lowest provincial minimum wage
denoted by the solid black line with diamond markers.
9When calculating these earnings growth measures, we require that earnings in the earlier period exceeds the earnings threshold
for that year, while we only require that earnings in the later year exceeds one-third of that year’s threshold. More precisely, the
later residuals, say Y8,C+1, are estimated using the sample for which earnings exceed one-third the threshold for that year (i.e.,
H̃8,C+1 > HC+1/3). Thus, we actually calculate two sets of residuals for every year based on the two different restrictions on minimum
earnings.
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increase in average earnings for women relative to men over time, as well as a gradual aging of the population
associated with the Baby Boom. While earnings have increased throughout the distribution, the magnitudes
of the increases clearly differ across the distribution, as we explore in detail below.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for selected cross-sectional samples
A. Basic summary statistics
Mean earnings Age shares (%)
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Women
Year (mill.) earnings earnings share (%) Men Women [25,35] [36,45] [46,55]
1985 8.0 35,968 33,899 44.1 44,353 25,351 47.1 32.2 20.7
1990 9.3 36,590 39,464 46.7 44,886 27,107 43.9 34.5 21.6
1995 9.6 36,770 42,218 47.3 44,351 28,309 37.9 36.1 25.9
2000 10.2 40,736 74,135 48.4 49,652 31,220 33.2 36.9 29.9
2005 10.5 41,855 75,630 49.0 50,766 32,582 32.7 34.0 33.3
2010 10.6 43,719 62,609 49.2 51,841 35,331 34.0 30.8 35.3
2015 10.8 45,759 67,350 48.8 53,961 37,151 36.0 31.1 33.0
B. Selected percentiles of annual earnings distribution (men and women combined)
Year %1 %5 %10 %25 %50 %75 %90 %95 %99 %99.9
1985 2,131 4,458 7,460 16,627 32,075 49,425 65,964 77,268 113,502 268,906
1990 2,075 4,626 7,798 17,003 32,221 49,259 66,940 79,466 121,651 315,828
1995 2,131 4,458 7,460 16,627 32,075 49,425 65,964 77,268 113,502 268,906
2000 2,200 5,045 8,483 18,199 33,515 52,113 72,590 88,891 159,125 593,560
2005 2,236 5,054 8,537 18,387 33,918 53,292 75,842 93,849 169,383 623,492
2010 2,566 5,492 9,169 19,406 35,422 56,354 80,244 100,141 176,748 552,109
2015 2,872 6,147 10,027 20,628 36,788 58,875 83,446 104,879 186,188 570,090
Notes: Annual earnings reported in 2018 U.S. dollars.
3 Economic and Policy Environment in Canada: 1983–2016
Before getting into our empirical analysis, we provide a very brief overview of the Canadian economy over
the past four decades, emphasizing factors that have been shown to or are likely to have impacted the evolution
of earnings inequality and dynamics.
Figure 1 documents real GDP per capita and employment rates for men and women ages 25–54 over time.
Since the early 1980s, male employment rates have hovered around 85%, while female employment rates
increased from less than 60% to about 78% at the onset of the Great Recession, stabilizing thereafter. Two
major recessions stand out—that of the early 1990s and the global Great Recession of 2008–09. The early
1990s recession was much deeper and more protracted in Canada than in the U.S., with many Canadian firms
restructuring, downsizing, and ultimately failing over this period. Fortin (1996) argues that tight monetary
and fiscal policy explain the stronger severity in Canada: the Bank of Canada maintained high interest rates
(relative to the U.S.) to reduce inflation, and the rising fiscal deficits (partially due to high interest rates
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and the recession itself) led to fiscal austerity, including large cuts to public sector employment. Freedman
and Macklem (1998) argue that the recession was exacerbated by other concurrent secular changes, such
as increasing competition from international trade. Figure 1 shows that, during the early 1990s recession,
both output and employment (especially among men) dropped considerably between 1989 and 1992. While
output and the female employment rate recovered over a few years, the male employment rate never returned
to its pre-recession peak. By comparison, the Great Recession produced much sharper but smaller drops in
output and employment in Canada. Output recovered quickly, while employment was slower to recover (and
never fully did for men).
The shaded vertical bars in Figure 1 (and subsequent figures) indicate years with at least one quarter of
negative GDP per capita growth. The downturns in 1986, 2001, and 2003 were all only a single quarter in
duration and were not formally labeled recessions. The most recent downturn reflects a 6-quarter period
of economic stagnation with modest negative growth in the first two quarters of 2015 and then again in the
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(b) Employment rate for men and women ages 25–54
Figure 1: Canadian macroeconomic conditions, 1983–2016
AsCanada has a small open economy, trade can have important effects on the economy and the distribution
of wages and earnings. After the 1988 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S., and its later extension
to the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Canadian economy relied more heavily
on international trade—the shares of exports and imports in GDP both increased from 25% in 1989 to 44%
and 39%, respectively, in 2000. According to Trefler (2004), the Canada–U.S. FTA caused a substantial
reallocation of workers and other resources across plants and industries, leading to a 5% reduction in jobs
and 6% increase in labor productivity in manufacturing between 1988 and 1996. Such a major reallocation
is likely to have destroyed some workers’ job-specific skills and altered the match quality of workers and
firms, both of which may have had lasting impacts on the distribution of earnings.
More recently, the oil and gas boom from roughly 2000 to 2015 clearly benefited the economies of
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland, with all experiencing substantial wage growth (relative to the
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rest of Canada) over this period. While Fortin and Lemieux (2015) show that this boom generated broad
benefits for workers in the affected provinces, reducing inequality in some cases, its impact on overall
inequality in Canada is likely to have been modest.
Immigration is also an important factor for Canada, with slightly more than one-in-five of all Canadians
having immigrated to the country. In 1976, Canada set its immigration priorities in the Immigration Act
which, among other things, led to the formation of the Economic Class of immigrants (i.e., immigrants who
are admitted based on their education and skills, with the intent of matching labor market needs). In the
1980s, the Economic Class was expanded to encourage business people and entrepreneurs to bring their
skills and financial assets to Canada to set up businesses and create employment opportunities. As of 2018,
the Economic Class accounted for more than half of all immigration to Canada. Aydemir and Borjas (2007)
find that the large inflows of skilled immigrants weakened the growth in Canada’s university premium.
Another potentially important trend has been the roughly 50% increase in real minimum wages over the
past few decades. This is likely to impact inequality at the bottom of the distribution through direct effects on
hourly wages and indirect effects on employment and hours of work. Appendix Figure A2 shows minimum
wages for each Canadian province over time, distinguishing those for the four most populous provinces. (The
solid black line with diamond markers reflects the lowest provincial minimum wage each period.) Fortin
et al. (2012) argue that increases in minimum wages in British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec during the
1990s had modest impacts on the lower end of the wage distribution in those provinces. Fortin and Lemieux
(2015) show that the sizeable increases in minimum wages (across all provinces) beginning in the mid-2000s
can explain much of the increase in wages at the 10th percentile, accounting for observed declines in wage
inequality over the bottom half of the distribution. The more widespread nature of the increases in the
2000s (compared to the 1990s increases) suggests that they are likely to have had more important impacts
on national inequality measures; however, the compression effects on lower wage levels need not translate
into compression in earnings at the bottom of the distribution.
The decline of unions may also influence the evolution of inequality. Between 1984 and 2015, the union
coverage rate in Canada fell from 46% to 29% for men and from 37% to 32% for women (Card, Lemieux, and
Riddell, 2020). While these changes (especially for men) are sizeable, Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2004)
suggest that stronger de-unionization in the U.S. and U.K. over the 1980s and 1990s may have contributed to
even sharper increases in inequality in those countries. In recent years, Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2020)
estimate that unions reduce the variance of log wages among Canadian men by less than 10%, with no effects
on wage inequality among Canadian women.
Finally, government tax and transfer policies can affect earnings inequality, largely through incentive
effects on labor supply. We briefly comment on some of the changes most likely to have impacted Canadian
earnings distributions over our sample period.10 First, we note two major federal tax reforms that are most
10See Frenette, Green, andMilligan (2009) for an analysis of the effects of changes in Canadian tax and transfer policy on after-tax
income inequality from 1980 to 2000.
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likely to have affected top earners (through labor supply incentives or reporting for tax purposes): the top tax
rate was lowered from 34% to 29% in 1988, while it was raised from 29% to 33% in 2016. Provincial tax
rates also declined in the late 1990s, which tended to benefit high-income families relatively more. Several
tax and transfer policy changes in the late 1990s created stronger work incentives for lower-income families,
especially those with children. Major changes in Unemployment Insurance (now referred to as Employment
Insurance in Canada) and social assistance directly encouraged work (Frenette, Green, and Milligan, 2009;
Finnie and Irvine, 2011), while the introduction of the National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS) and
its integration with social assistance in many provinces helped to reduce the “welfare wall” generated by
dollar-for-dollar drops in benefits with income (Milligan and Stabile, 2007; Milligan, 2016). Along with
these changes, provincial expansions in job-protected maternity/parental leave during the early 1990s and in
2000 are also likely to have had greater effects on female (relative to male) labor supply and earnings (Baker
and Milligan, 2008).
4 Earnings Inequality, Dynamics, and Mobility in Canada: 1983–2016
This section documents individual earnings inequality, dynamics, and mobility in Canada from 1983–2016
using the T1PMF tax file discussed in Section 2.
4.1 Earnings inequality over time
Webegin by studying the evolution of earnings inequality, distinguishing between long-term trends and short-
term cyclical patterns (especially responses to the major recession of 1989–1991 and the Great Recession of
2008–09), followed by a brief accounting of earnings concentration at the top of the earnings distribution.
Long-term trends. In 1985, median earnings for Canadian men were about $55,000 Canadian (denomi-
nated in 2018 dollars), nearly double the roughly $30,000 earned by the median Canadian woman. Men at
the 90th percentile earned nearly seven times as much as men at the 10th percentile, while women at the 90th
percentile earned about nine times as much as women at the 10th percentile.
Table 2 reports several percentiles of the log earnings distributions for men and women in both 1985 and
2015, providing a summary of long-term changes in Canadian earnings inequality over a 30-year period.
Figures 2 and 3 show changes in various percentiles over time (relative to their initial 1983 value), where the
latter focuses on upper earnings percentiles, including the top 1%, 0.1%, and 0.01%. Together, these figures
and Table 2 show that between 1985 and 2015, Canadian women experienced sizeable increases in earnings
throughout the distribution—by about 30 log points at the median and more everywhere else.11 Canadian
men did not fare as well, with their sizeable earnings advantage relative to women narrowing considerably at
all earnings percentiles (by half at the median). While men at the top and bottom of the earnings distribution
11As documented by Fortin et al. (2012) and Green and Sand (2015), these findings are consistent with time patterns for hourly
and weekly wages based on Census and LFS data.
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experienced healthy gains, men at the 25th and 50th percentiles are no better off today than they were more
than 30 years earlier. Among both men and women, those at the very top of the earnings distribution (i.e.,
top 1% and above) gained substantially. Between 1983 and 2007, earnings shot up more than 50 log points
for men and women at the 99th percentile and more than doubled for those in the top 0.1%. Following the
Great Recession, earnings fell substantially for men in the top 0.1%, while earnings were largely stagnant
for their female counterparts.
Table 2: Percentiles of log(H8,C ) for Men and Women, 1985 and 2015
Men Women
1985 2015 1985 2015
%5 9.03 9.18 8.40 8.83
%10 9.56 9.68 8.85 9.31
%25 10.37 10.39 9.62 10.02
%50 10.91 10.94 10.31 10.61
%75 11.23 11.38 10.72 11.06
%90 11.47 11.73 11.04 11.42
%95 11.63 11.97 11.20 11.59
%99 12.06 12.59 11.48 12.05
%99.9 13.03 13.82 11.96 12.90
%99.99 14.24 15.14 12.95 13.96
%90 − %10 1.92 2.05 2.19 2.11
%90 − %50 0.57 0.79 0.73 0.82
%50 − %10 1.35 1.27 1.46 1.30
Notes: Due to sample sizes and confidentiality rules, we are
unable to report earnings at the 99.99 percentile for women
prior to 1988. We impute the 1985 value of %99.99 for women



























































Figure 2: Changes in percentiles of log(H8,C ) (1983=0)




































































Figure 3: Change in upper percentiles of log(H8,C ) (1983=0)
Notes: Due to sample sizes and confidentiality rules, we are unable to report earnings at the 99.99 percentile for women prior to 1988. In panel (b),
we impute the 1983–1988 changes in %99.99 for women using their changes for %99.9.
(mostly coming during the early 1990s recession) as measured by the 90–10 percentile difference or standard
deviation of log earnings (see Figure 4), while these measures of earnings inequality declined slightly for
women.12 As discussed in Green and Sand (2015), the evolution of inequality in Canada differed at the top
and bottom of the earnings distribution. Both men and women saw earnings inequality increase in the top
half of the distribution, while inequality declined at the bottom. See Figure 5, which shows the evolution
of 90–50 and 50–10 percentile differences in log earnings.13 The main driver of the long-run difference in
earnings inequality between Canadian men and women was the stronger increase in inequality at the top for
men, with their 90–50 difference rising 22 log points between 1985 and 2015 compared to just 9 log points
for women.14 Among women, the decline in the 50–10 difference more than offset the modest increase in
the 90–50 difference. These general patterns differ markedly from those documented by Guvenen et al.
(2018) and Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010) for the U.S. over the same period, where overall earnings
inequality rose substantially more due to a stronger secular increase in the 90–50 difference and a sharp
increase in the 50–10 difference after 2000.15
These long-term trends in inequality (at both the top and bottom of the earnings distribution) are quite
similar when looking at residualized annual (Y8,C ) or permanent (Y%8,C ) earnings. (See Appendix Figures A3–
A8.) Thus, the evolution of inequality in Canada over our sample period does not appear to be driven
12Figure 4 reports 2.56 × the standard deviation of earnings, which would equal the 90–10 difference if earnings were normally
distributed. The smaller 90–10 difference (for men) indicates that the earnings distribution has fat tails relative to a normal
distribution.
13Based on data from the Canadian LFS, Fortin and Lemieux (2015) conclude that much of the increase in wages at the bottom
relative to middle of the distribution since the mid-2000s (especially among women) can be explained by increases in minimum
wages (see Figure A2); however, Figure 5 shows no obvious break in trend for the 50–10 difference in log earnings for men or
women during this period.
14The sharper increase in the 90–50 difference for men relative to women is largely driven by differences in trends for median
earnings, which were largely stagnant for men but increased over 30 log points for women (see Figure 2).



































































































Figure 5: 90–50 and 50–10 percentile differences for log(H8,C )
by changes in the age composition of the workforce or by major changes in the variability of year-to-year
fluctuations in earnings. The latter point is even more forcefully made by Morissette and Berube (1996),
who show that over the early part of our time period (between 1975–84 and 1984–93), the increase in annual
earnings inequality was very similar to the increase for 6- and 10-year averages of earnings.
The evolution of earnings inequality for the overall population, combining both men and women, reflects
the substantial narrowing of the gender earnings gap, coupled with modest (sometimes opposing) changes
within gender. Together, these influences produce time patterns for 90–10, 90–50, and 50–10 log earnings
percentile differences that look quite similar to those observed for women (see Appendix Figure A9): overall
inequality declined very slightly, reflecting a nearly 20 log point decline in the 50–10 difference and 15 log
point increase in the 90–50 difference.
Finally, Table 3 documents the share of earnings earned by each quintile of the earnings distribution
(and for top percentiles) in 1985 and 2015, while Figure 6 graphs the changes in these shares relative to their
corresponding 1983 values. As might be expected from our previous results, the top quintile of all earners
12
increased its share of earnings from 41% in 1983 to 46% in 2006, before falling to roughly 45% after the
Great Recession.16 These gains came largely at the expense of workers in quintiles 3 and 4, who saw their
shares decrease by about 2 percentage points from roughly 18% and 26%, respectively. As discussed below,
the increase for the top quintile comes entirely from increases in the share of earnings among the top 5%.
Altogether, we find that broad-based measures of earnings inequality changed very little in Canada over
the past 35–40 years, although earnings rose substantially at the very top.17
Table 3: Earnings shares (%) for quintiles and top percentiles (men and women combined), 1985 and 2015
Earnings Quintiles 1985 2015 Top Percentiles 1985 2015
Quintile 1 4.15 4.34 Top 10% 24.97 29.48
Quintile 2 11.05 10.46 Top 5% 15.11 19.36
Quintile 3 17.88 16.16 Top 1% 5.21 7.98
Quintile 4 25.44 23.50 Top 0.5% 3.48 5.66
Quintile 5 (top 20%) 41.49 45.54 Top 0.1% 1.50 2.66











































































(b) Changes in top earnings shares (1983=0)
Figure 6: Changes in earnings shares for log(H8,C ) for men and women combined (1983=0)
Cyclical features. As Figures 2–5 demonstrate, there is considerable cyclicality in earnings inequality,
especially for men.18 Most notably, the early 1990s recession drove men’s earnings at the 10th percentile
down more than 20% over just a few years, while it took more than 5 years for earnings at the bottom of
16Appendix Figure A12 shows that the Gini coefficient followed a qualitatively similar time pattern, rising from about 0.375 in
1983 to slightly more than 0.42 in 2006, then falling by about 0.01 after the Great Recession.
17Using a measure of per capita household earnings (rather than including men and women separately) and combining data from
the Canadian SCF and SLID, Brzozowski et al. (2010) document a stronger increase in the variance of log earnings between 1983
and 2005 but a similar increase in the Gini coefficient relative to our findings reported in Appendix Figures A9 and A12. Our
patterns for the evolution of earnings shares in Figure 6(a) are broadly consistent with the Census-based findings of Beach (2016)
for 1980–2005.
18Brzozowski et al. (2010) show that the cyclical nature of earnings in Canada is driven by cyclicality in both wages and hours
of work, both seemingly stronger for men than women over the 1980s and 1990s.
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the distribution to (nearly) recover. The Great Recession produced qualitatively similar, but more muted,
effects. By contrast, Figure 2(a) shows that men earning at the 75th and 90th percentiles experienced little
to no decline during economic downturns. Figure 5(a) shows that the early 1990s recession, and to a lesser
extent the Great Recession, generated dramatic increases in the 50–10 difference but negligible impacts on
the 90–50 difference for men. Following recessions, the 50–10 difference slowly returned to pre-recession
levels, while the 90–50 difference grew at a fairly constant rate through good times and bad. For the most
part, these patterns are similar but substantially weaker for women. Figure 5(b) reveals one notable exception:
women experienced gradual declines in the 50–10 difference during good times that more than offset the
sharp increases during recessions, producing the long-term decline in inequality among women discussed
earlier.
As shown in Guvenen et al. (2018), most of these patterns are evident in the U.S. as well, where the 50–10
difference is strongly counter-cyclical while the 90–50 difference is not, and cyclicality is much stronger for
men than for women. A notable exception is the sharp increase in the 50–10 difference for American men
and women from 2000 to the onset of the Great Recession. By contrast, this measure of inequality at the
bottom declined slightly in Canada over this period despite two short economic downturns.
The cyclicality of earnings inequality, especially at the bottom of the distribution, is also apparent for
residualized permanent earnings, Y%
8,C , as shown in Appendix Figure A7. This finding is broadly consistent
with growing recent evidence on the disproportionate impacts of recessions on low-skilled workers (Hoynes,
Miller, and Schaller, 2012; Forsythe, 2019; Hershbein and Kahn, 2018). Further evidence on the differential
impacts of the early 1990s recession on workers of different skill levels is exhibited in Figure 7, which
documents the evolution of 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of log earnings residuals over the periods
1988–1998 and 1995–2005 (relative to 1988 or 1995, respectively) separately for different quartiles of recent
residualized permanent earnings (Y%C measured in 1987 or 1994, respectively). Figures 7(a) and 7(b) show
that, among workers with low permanent earnings, inequality grew substantially more during the early 1990s
recession relative to the boom period of the late 1990s. Notably, the stronger increase in inequality over the
early 1990s recession (for those with low permanent earnings) is driven entirely by a widening at the bottom
of the distribution: earnings at the 10th percentile increased much less (or fell much more) through the
early 1990s recession than during the later period of sustained economic growth. By contrast, Figure 7(d)
shows that residual earnings distributions evolved very similarly across the two periods for workers in the
top permanent earnings quartile. Appendix Figure A13 shows qualitatively similar (though more muted)
patterns over the Great Recession.
Finally, we draw attention to Figure 3, which shows that among those with earnings in the top 0.1%,
earnings are just as cyclical as for workers at the bottom of the distribution. Unlike workers throughout
most of the distribution, those at the very top saw their earnings fall more during the Great Recession than
during the early 1990s recession. Earnings at the very top also dropped considerably during more modest
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Figure 7: Changes in percentiles of Y8,C over 1988–1998 and 1995–2005 by residualized permanent earnings
quartile in 1987 or 1994, respectively
Guvenen, Kaplan, and Song (2014).
Earnings concentration at the very top. Table 3 documents the substantial concentration of earnings at
the top of the distribution in Canada. More than a quarter of total earnings goes to the top 10% of all earners.
Between 1985 and 2015, the share of earnings going to the top 1% rose by 53% (from 5.2% to 8.0% of all
earnings), while the share going to the top 0.01% nearly doubled (from 0.46% to 0.86%). Figure 6(b) shows
that top earnings shares increased until 2007 and then declined afterwards. The short-term fluctuations in
top earnings shares are mostly procyclical; however, they have not recovered since the sharp decline during
the Great Recession. We can see that most of the rise and fall in the top earnings shares was driven by the
top 0.5% of earners, with earnings shares rising, then falling, for the top 0.1% and top 0.01% as well. The
share going to those in the top 0.5% to top 1% also increased up until the Great Recession, then leveled off,
while the share going to those earning from the top 1% to top 5% continued rising through 2014. The share
15
going to the top 5% to top 10% is counter-cyclical and shows little long-run trend.19
Saez and Veall (2005) and Veall (2012) report similar patterns for top income shares in Canada over
1982 to 2010 using the Longitudinal Administrative Data (LAD), a 20% random sample of all tax filers.
Saez and Veall (2005) further show that top income shares in Canada evolved very similarly to those in the
U.S. (potentially due to the highly integrated labor market for skilled workers). Moreover, top total income
shares are similar to top earnings shares for recent years in Canada, because labor income has become the
dominant source of income, even at the very top.
Most recently, the sharp decline in earnings shares for workers in the top 1% and above in 2016 (see
Figure A14) could reflect changes in response to the 2015–2016 economic downturn, although this downturn
was quite mild. Alternatively, it could reflect behavioral responses (in labor supply or income reporting for
tax purposes) to the 2016 increase in the top marginal income tax rate (from 29% to 33%) for those with
incomes above $200,000. To the extent that tax changes do drive top earnings shares in the short-term,
Milligan and Smart (2015) find that they do not explain the long-run trends in Canadian top income shares.
4.2 Earnings growth and volatility
We now turn to an analysis of earnings growth rates and earnings volatility (i.e., the dispersion of residual
log earnings growth) over time. Variation in earnings growth is of considerable interest, because it reflects
individual earnings risk as well as heterogeneity in lifecycle skill growth. Both have important implications
for individual consumption/savings decisions and the aggregate distribution of wealth.
A wave of interest in earnings volatility was initially sparked by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994), who
documented an increase in U.S. earnings volatility and variation in transitory earnings shocks over the 1970s
and early 1980s. More recently, debate has arisen regarding U.S. trends in volatility over the 1980s and
1990s, with survey-based data suggesting fairly stable (or growing) volatility over time and administrative
data suggesting a strong secular decline. See Moffitt (2020) for a review of this literature and efforts to
reconcile results across studies and data sources.
Since earnings growth varies strongly over the lifecycle, this analysis focuses on annual and 5-year
changes in residualized log earnings, Δ1Y8,C and Δ5Y8,C , respectively, where the latter are roughly centered
around C (i.e., Δ5Y8,C = Y8,C+2 − Y8,C−3).20 In interpreting variation in annual and 5-year growth, it is useful to
keep in mind that the former reflects a roughly equal balance of temporary and persistent changes in earnings,
while the latter largely reflects the influence of more persistent changes.
As in the previous subsection, we organize much of our discussion around long-term trends and cyclical
variation; however, we also provide a more detailed look at the distribution of earnings growth and how it
19Shares going to, for example, the top 5% to top 10% can be determined by looking at the difference between the shares going to
the top 10% and top 5% in Figure 6(b). See Appendix Figure A14 for the evolution of shares going to various ranges within the top
10%. Appendix Figure A15 shows that the extreme right tail (top 1% and top 5%) of the population earnings distribution shifted
further to the right and flattened over time.
20The evolution of annual earnings inequality based on arc percent changes is qualitatively similar to that reported here for growth
in annual log earnings. Results available upon request.
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Table 4: Percentiles of Δ1Y8,C and Δ5Y8,C for men and women over time
Δ1Y8,C Δ
5Y8,C
Men Women Men Women
1985 2015 1985 2015 1986 2014 1986 2014
%5 -0.71 -0.68 -0.84 -0.88 -0.99 -1.01 -1.24 -1.22
%10 -0.32 -0.30 -0.41 -0.40 -0.52 -0.53 -0.67 -0.67
%25 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.17 -0.13 -0.10 -0.13
%50 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.06
%75 0.13 0.15 0.25 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.46 0.34
%90 0.41 0.41 0.64 0.56 0.75 0.69 1.06 0.90
%95 0.75 0.73 1.01 0.96 1.22 1.12 1.51 1.34
%90 − %10 0.73 0.72 1.05 0.97 1.27 1.23 1.72 1.56
%90 − %50 0.38 0.36 0.54 0.49 0.75 0.65 0.94 0.84
%50 − %10 0.36 0.36 0.51 0.47 0.53 0.58 0.79 0.73
varies with recent earnings levels and age.
Long-term trends. Table 4 reveals very little long-run change in the distribution of annual (5-year) log
earnings growth for men between 1985 and 2015 (1986 and 2014).21 Women were much less likely to
experience high rates of earnings growth in the more recent period—relative to the early 1980s—with
annual (5-year) earnings growth rates declining by as much as 8 (17) log points at higher percentiles. Not
surprisingly, then, we observe little long-term change in earnings volatility for men, but moderate reductions
in volatility for women. The 90–10 difference for annual (5-year) log earnings growth amongwomen declines
by 8 (16) log points between the beginning and end of our sample, with compression occurring at both the top
and bottom of the distribution. Both earnings increases and reductions tended to shrink over time for women,
bringing their levels of earnings volatility closer to those of men. Figures 8 and 9 display the full evolution
of changes in log earnings growth at different percentiles (all relative to baseline growth rates in 1983) over
our sample period. The evolution of annual earnings volatility as measured by the 90–10 difference or by
90–50 and 50–10 differences are reported in Figures 10 and 11.22
Our findings on the stability of earnings volatility for Canadian men (and very modest declines for
women) over the past several decades are largely consistent with the conclusions from most survey-based
studies in the U.S. (e.g., see the summary of recent evidence from several different survey-based sudies
in Moffitt, 2020); however, this differs greatly from the strong secular declines in volatility documented in
studies using American administrative data, which are more directly comparable to our analysis (Sabelhaus
and Song, 2010; Guvenen, Ozkan, and Song, 2014; Bloom et al., 2017). For example, Bloom et al. (2017)
21Our earliest measure of Δ5Y8,C is from 1986, which reflects growth in log earnings between 1983 and 1988, while our latest
measure is from 2014, which reflects growth in log earnings between 2011 and 2016.
22Appendix Figures A16 and A17 show that volatility time patterns are qualitatively similar for analogous measures based on
























































































































































































































Figure 10: 90–10 percentile difference and variance of Δ1Y8,C
exploit data from the Social Security Administration and employ similar sampling restrictions to ours. They








































Figure 11: 90–50 and 50–10 percentile differences for Δ1Y8,C
points between 1983 and 2012—more than three times the declines we observe over that period.
The skewness of earnings innovations can influence both consumption/savings behavior and asset prices
(Mankiw, 1986; Kocherlakota and Pistaferri, 2009). Figure 12(a) reports the evolution of Kelley skewness for
Δ1Y8,C over time, while the time series for its moment-based coefficient of skewness is reported in Appendix
Figure A18(a).23 Skewness patterns are quite similar for men and women, and given the discussion so far, it
is not surprising to see little long-term trend.
We also explore the kurtosis of log earnings growth distributions, with higher values generally indicating
greater mass in the center and tails of distributions relative to the “shoulders”. Figure 12(b) reports excess
Crow-Siddiqui kurtosis over time, with positive values ranging from 7.5 to 12.0 indicating much stronger
kurtosis than implied by a normal distribution (i.e., leptokurtic). Intuitively, this means that earnings growth
tends to be very close to zero, with an excess frequency of very high/low growth outliers. While kurtosis
appears to have declined slightly for men over the long term, it has substantially risen for women since
2000. As reported in Appendix Figure A18(b), the standard moment-based measure of excess kurtosis also
suggests that log earnings growth is leptokurtic; however, it suggests a modest long-run increase in kurtosis
for both men and women.24
See Appendix A.3 for analogous figures for 5-year log earnings growth dispersion, skewness, and excess
kurtosis. To visualize earnings growth distributions and their departures from normality, Appendix A.3 also
shows the empirical densities (Figures A21–A22) and log densities (Figures A23–A24) for annual and 5-year
residual log earnings growth in 2005 (other years look quite similar). Compared to the best-fitting normal
23For variable G with mean `, standard deviation f, and 90, 50, and 10 percentiles %90, %50, and %10, the Kelley skewness





skewness measures equal zero for symmetric distributions, while positive (negative) values imply that more of the distribution lies
to the right (left) of the median or mean.
24For variable G with mean `, standard deviation f, and 97.5, 75, 25, and 2.5 percentiles %97.5, %75, %25, and %2.5, the
excess Crow-Siddiqui kurtosis measure is (%97.5 − %2.5)/(%75 − %25) − 2.91, while the moment-based excess kurtosis measure




− 3, where both “excess” measures subtract off the corresponding measure of kurtosis for the normal
distribution.
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distribution, the distribution of earnings growth has greater mass at the center and tails, with the left tail
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Figure 12: Skewness and excess kurtosis of Δ1Y8,C
Cyclical features. As discussed in Guvenen, Ozkan, and Song (2014), the cyclical nature of earnings risk
plays an important role in macroeconomic and financial models of consumption/savings and asset prices.
We now describe the impacts of major recessions on earnings growth distributions in Canada, including
summary features related to earnings volatility, skewness, and kurtosis.
Figures 8 and 9 reveal considerable cyclical variation in log earnings growth at the high (strong positive
growth) and low (strong earnings declines) ends of the distribution. Focusing first on men, we observe
a modest increase in median earnings growth during recessions, but sizeable reductions in log earnings
growth at both the top and bottom. For example, median annual log earnings growth rose by about 5 log
points during the early 1990s recession, while low- and high-end annual growth rates dropped by 5–15 log
points. Movements in 5-year growth were nearly twice as strong, indicating strong persistent effects of major
recessions on earnings for many workers. The cyclical variation in annual log earnings growth for women
was quite similar, though slightly more muted at the bottom and middle of the distribution. Changes in
five-year log earnings growth over the business cycle were notably different, with much larger and more
drawn-out declines in earnings growth at the top compared to the bottom. Indeed, the recessionary declines
in 5-year log earnings growth at the top of the distribution were not offset by increases during periods of
economic growth, leading to a roughly 15 log point long-term decline. Altogether, we see that Canadian
recessions led to sizeable reductions in the prevalence of high earnings growth and increases in the likelihood
of severe earnings losses. For men, these changes were reversed during times of economic growth, so there
were only modest long-term changes in the distribution of annual or 5-year log earnings growth. This was
also true for the distribution of annual log earnings growth among women; however, the female distribution
of 5-year growth became much more compressed after the early 1990s recession.
20
These patterns imply substantial increases in male earnings volatility during recessions but much weaker
increases for women (Figure 10). This counter-cyclical earnings volatility is driven entirely by greater losses
at the bottom of the distribution during recessions (exhibited by rising 50–10 differences) and is partially
offset by reductions in growth at the top (exhibited by falling 90–50 differences). See Figure 11. Taken
together, these patterns imply strong counter-cyclicality of (negative) skewness in log earnings growth as
reported in Figure 12(a). Guvenen, Ozkan, and Song (2014) and Bloom et al. (2017) document similar
cyclical patterns for skewness in earnings growth in the U.S., but they find less cyclical variation in earnings
volatility.25 As discussed in Mankiw (1986), Constantinides and Duffie (1996), and recently Guvenen,
Ozkan, and Song (2014), the counter-cyclicality of both volatility and (negative) skewness may help explain
asset prices and the equity premium puzzle.26
Earnings growth and volatility by recent earnings levels and age. Guvenen et al. (2019) find that, among
American men, the negative skewness and kurtosis of log earnings growth increase with recent earnings
levels and age, arguing that these patterns are broadly consistent with the predictions from job ladder models
(e.g., Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Hubmer, 2018), where large earnings changes are mostly associated
with job losses or job switches. Both high earners and older workers have, on average, climbed further up the
job ladder, thus there is more room to fall down and experience large earnings drops. The greater chance of
large, yet infrequent, earnings losses can lead to more negative skewness and kurtosis in the earnings growth
distribution for high-earning, older workers.
We now reproduce these patterns for Canadian men and women. Figure 13 reports the 90–10 percentile
difference forΔ1Y8,C by quantiles of (lagged residual) permanent earnings Y%8,C−1 for three age groups. Workers
with higher recent earnings generally experience lower dispersion in their future earnings growth, although
this relationship is reversed for those with very high permanent earnings. Conditional on permanent earnings,
future earnings growth is more variable among younger workers, especially young women. The strong
volatility in earnings for young women is largely driven by dispersion at the lower end of the distribution, as
is clear from the strong negative skewness for most women ages 25–34 in Figure 14. Interestingly, there is
little difference in skewness by age for men or for women ages 35 and over. Skewness is generally declining
(or becomes more negative) for workers with higher levels of permanent earnings, although the differences
are quite modest for men and older women. Figure 14 also shows excess Crow-Siddiqui kurtosis by age
and permanent earnings. This measure of kurtosis is increasing in both age and permanent earnings levels
for both men and women in the bottom third of the permanent earnings distribution. At higher permanent
earnings levels, kurtosis is largely independent of age for men, while it becomes hump-shaped for women.
Except for young women, kurtosis is decreasing in permanent earnings over the upper half of the distribution.
25Complementary efforts to separately identify transitory and permanent shocks to earnings (in the U.S.) conclude that the
variance of transitory shocks is counter-cyclical (e.g., Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2012).
26Figure 12(b) suggests that log earnings growth becomesmore leptokurtic (asmeasured by excess Crow-Siddiqui kurtosis) during
recessions; however, Appendix Figure A18(b) suggests that kurtosis (based on the standard moment-based measure) declined for

































(b) 90–10 percentile difference (women)
Figure 13: 90–10 percentile difference of Δ1Y8,C by permanent earnings and age group
While the dispersion patterns reported in Figure 13 are similar to their U.S. counterparts documented in
Guvenen et al. (2019), the skewness and kurtosis patterns in Figure 14 are quite different. Interestingly, our
moment-based measures of dispersion, skewness, and kurtosis reported in Appendix Figure A25, as well as
measures based on 5-year earnings growth (Appendix Figures A26 and A27), are far more consistent with
their findings and standard job ladder models.
4.3 Earnings mobility
Another way to study the dynamics of earnings, especially over extended periods of time, is to examine
earnings mobility, the likelihood of moving from one part of the earnings distribution to another. Such
movements across the distribution speak to whether there is churning across the distribution or stagnation.
This is important, because high levels of mobility indicate less inequality in long-run (or permanent) earnings
for any given level of cross-sectional inequality in annual earnings. The common rags-to-riches story is
one part, but of equal interest is the likelihood of movements down the distribution. The use of transition
matrices to study earnings mobility and its effect on long-run inequality was popularized by Buchinsky and
Hunt (1999). Bowlus and Robin (2012) use their method to calculate remaining lifetime earnings measures
for several countries, finding that Canada has more long-term inequality than the U.S. but less than the U.K.27
Here, we examine mobility across distributions of annual log earnings residuals YC and our alternative
permanent earnings measure %̃8,C . In both cases, we measure relative movements within earnings distri-
butions. We explore mobility across 5- and 10-year time spans for men and women in order to determine
the degree to which duration affects mobility—previous studies often find that mobility levels increase with
duration. In addition, we examine mobility across different time periods to see if there have been any changes
in the mobility patterns over time in Canada.
27Long-run inequality can also be studied by using average earnings over a long period of time or by estimating an earnings
process with permanent and transitory components. For Canada, an example of the former is Morissette and Berube (1996), while































































































(d) Excess Crow-Siddique kurtosis (women)
Figure 14: Skewness and excess kurtosis of Δ1Y8,C by permanent earnings and age group
We begin by studying mobility in annual log earnings residuals (YC ) over 1 year and 5 years. Figure 15
shows the average percentile of residuals in the future period for each percentile grouping in year C = 2005,
where percentiles have been grouped into 2.5 percentage point bins along the x-axis. Also shown is the
average percentile after 1 year and 5 years for the top 0.1% of the residual distribution in t. As expected,
mobility is positive at the bottom of the distribution and negative at the top. Because we are examining
mobility within a distribution (i.e., movements across percentiles), there is only one direction to move at each
end of the distribution. For both men and women, the cross-over occurs around the 30th percentile for the
1-year transition and at the 40th percentile for the 5-year transition. This indicates greater upward mobility
over a 5-year period for those at the lower end of the residual distribution. Furthermore, the gains are greater
at the bottom of the distribution than the losses are at the top. Consistent with much of the literature, mobility
is greater over 5 years than 1 year, indicating the importance of mobility for long-run inequality. We also find
very little difference in mobility between those in the top 2.5 percentage point bin (97.5–100) and those at
the top 0.1%. Appendix Figure A28 reveals very little change between 1985 and 2005 in the 5-year mobility
relationships for men and women, except for a slight tilt toward less mobility overall and a small increase in
23
mobility at the very bottom of the distribution.28
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Figure 15: One- and 5-year mobility of residuals Y8,C for C = 2005
These findings are similar to other mobility studies for Canada. Using similar tax data, Beach and Finnie
(1998) calculate transition matrices across quintiles for 1-year changes, 6-year changes, and 12-year changes
from 1982 to 1994, finding that mobility increases with duration between earnings measures.29 They also
find a decline in the exit rate out of the bottom of the distribution for the more recent years. Lammam,
Karabegović, and Veldhuis (2012) provide a more recent analysis of income mobility over the 1990–2009
period, which also finds that mobility increases as the period length increases.
Next, we examine long-term mobility in our alternative permanent earnings measure %̃8,C (i.e., average
earnings over C − 2, C − 1, and C, including up to two zero or low earnings levels), which smooths out some
of the transitory movements around the distribution.30 Figure 16 shows how mobility varies across the
alternative permanent earnings distribution by age over a 10-year period.31 Figure 16(a) shows the mobility
in permanent earnings over 10 years for men who are 25–34 or 35–44 in year t, while Figure 16(b) shows the
same for women.32 The figure shows that 10-year mobility is decreasing by age for both men and women.
We also examine the evolution of long-term mobility over time for the alternative permanent earnings
measure. Figure 17 shows the average %̃8,C+10 by each percentile bin of the %̃8,C distribution for the years 1985,
1995, and 2005. (Appendix Figure A30 shows the same changes in 5-year mobility.) The cross-over point
for 10-year mobility is around the 40th percentile similar to the cross-over points for residualized annual
28The results for 1-year mobility show even less change over this period and are available upon request.
29Their earnings measure differs from ours in that it includes net self-employment income in addition to total employment income.
30For years in which individuals do not file taxes or indicate zero earnings on their tax return, a value of zero is included in this
average. Thus, this earnings measure may reflect extended periods out of the labor force, out of the country, or in unemployment.
We have conducted sensitivity analyses which exclude these years of zero earnings by non-filers. The results are virtually identical,
suggesting that temporary periods out of the labor force or country are similar to temporary periods of minimal or zero earnings in
terms of mobility. These results are available upon request.
31This figure graphs the average over all available 10-year periods with initial years from 1985 to 2006 of the average percentile
of %̃8,C+10 for each percentile grouping in year t with the percentiles grouped into 2.5 percentage point bins except for the top 0.1%
which has its own bin.
32Appendix Figure A29 shows these same patterns for 5-year mobility.
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Figure 16: Ten-year mobility in alternative permanent earnings, %̃8,C , by age
earnings. As with residualized annual earnings, there is more mobility (at both the top and bottom of the
distribution) after 10 years than 5 years, and those at the top 0.1% of the distribution do not appear to exhibit
different mobility patterns. There is very little change over time in either 5- or 10-year mobility relationships.
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Figure 17: Evolution of 10-year mobility in alternative permanent earnings, %̃8,C , over time
Finally, we examine permanent earnings mobility using 10×10 decile transition matrices. Table 5 shows
5- and 10-year transitions for 2005 based on the combined sample of men and women using the alternative
permanent earnings measure %̃8,C .33 Transition matrices are helpful in understanding the mobility patterns,
because they reveal persistence (or lack thereof) along the diagonal and the symmetry (or lack thereof) in
terms of upward and downward movements throughout the distribution. Panel (A) of Table 5 shows 5-year
transitions starting in 2005. Here, we find greater persistence at the extremes of the distribution than in
the middle and more persistence at the top than the bottom of distribution.34 In addition, the transition
33Appendix Table A2 shows 5- and 10-year transitions for 1985. Transition matrices for 1995 are also available upon request.
34This finding of higher persistence in the extreme deciles was also found by Bowlus and Robin (2012) for Canada for the
1996–2001 period.
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rates are slightly lower just to the right of the diagonal than just to the left. However, it is very unlikely for
individuals to make extreme moves out of either tail, with a higher probability of going from the 10th decile
to the 1st than the 1st to the 10th. Panel (B) of Table 5 shows the transition matrix for 10-year changes.
As expected, the transition rates along the diagonal are substantially reduced compared to 5-year changes,
indicating greater mobility over 10 years than 5. However, there remains strong persistence at the top, with
50% of those in the top decile remaining there 10 years later. In comparison, less than 35% of those in
the bottom decile are still there after 10 years.35 By comparing Table 5 and Appendix Table A2, we again
see that little has changed over time, although there does appear to be a pattern of declining persistence in
the middle of the distribution, with a modest increase in downward mobility. This decline in persistence is
not observed at the top or bottom of the distribution. Further, the likelihood of going from the very bottom
decile to the top two deciles (i.e., ‘rags to riches’) has almost doubled for the 5-year change (this increase is
also present, but weaker, for the 10-year change).
Table 5: Transitions across Deciles for %̃8,C over 5 and 10 Years Starting in 2005
(A) Five-year mobility
C + 5
C decile 1 decile 2 decile 3 decile 4 decile 5 decile 6 decile 7 decile 8 decile 9 decile 10
decile 1 40.1 22.9 13.5 8.2 5.1 3.6 2.7 1.9 1.2 0.8
decile 2 22.5 26.3 18.2 11.7 7.6 5.3 3.6 2.5 1.5 0.8
decile 3 12.9 19.0 23.1 16.1 10.5 7.0 5.0 3.5 2.0 1.0
decile 4 8.2 11.2 18.1 22.2 15.2 10.1 6.6 4.3 2.8 1.4
decile 5 5.4 7.4 10.2 19.2 23.4 14.3 9.4 5.8 3.2 1.7
decile 6 3.8 5.1 6.6 9.7 20.7 23.9 14.3 9.0 4.8 2.1
decile 7 2.7 3.5 4.4 5.8 8.9 21.9 25.7 15.5 8.3 3.2
decile 8 2.0 2.3 3.1 3.5 4.8 8.3 22.7 29.7 17.4 6.2
decile 9 1.4 1.4 2.0 2.3 2.5 3.9 7.4 22.7 39.6 16.9
decile 10 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.6 5.1 19.2 65.8
(B) Ten-year mobility
C + 10
C decile 1 decile 2 decile 3 decile 4 decile 5 decile 6 decile 7 decile 8 decile 9 decile 10
decile 1 32.1 21.5 14.1 9.4 6.6 5.0 4.0 3.2 2.3 1.7
decile 2 21.2 22.0 16.6 11.8 8.5 6.5 5.0 3.9 2.7 1.8
decile 3 14.0 18.4 18.5 14.3 10.5 8.0 6.2 4.7 3.3 2.1
decile 4 9.6 12.4 17.6 17.2 13.3 9.9 7.6 5.7 4.2 2.5
decile 5 6.9 8.5 12.4 18.6 16.5 12.7 9.7 6.9 4.9 2.9
decile 6 5.1 6.1 7.9 13.1 19.1 16.2 12.8 9.4 6.6 3.6
decile 7 3.9 4.4 5.2 7.1 13.5 19.8 17.4 13.7 9.8 5.1
decile 8 2.9 3.2 3.6 4.2 6.5 13.6 21.0 20.4 16.0 8.5
decile 9 2.3 2.1 2.6 2.6 3.5 5.8 12.2 23.9 27.4 17.5
decile 10 2.0 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.5 4.0 8.3 22.7 54.2
Notes: Each entry reflects the probability of moving from the decile reported for that row to the decile reported for the column.
35One reason for this pattern is likely upward movement due to lifecycle skill accumulation or career progression, as these
measures do not remove age effects.
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4.4 Inequality by age and cohort
Adecades-long literature onwage and earnings inequality documents worseningwage and earnings outcomes
for younger relative to older workers over time (see, e.g., the survey in Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). More
recently, Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller (2012) highlight the stronger adverse employment effects of recessions
on younger and less-skilled workers. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) show that, consistent with implicit
contracting models, poor labor market conditions appear to have lasting effects on wages, while Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) demonstrate the lasting effects of job displacement on earnings. Numerous
subsequent studies confirm these basic findings. Taken together, these results suggest that recessions are
likely to reduce the earnings of younger workers more than older workers and that they may differentially
distort the lifecycle patterns of workers from different cohorts.
In Figure 18, we plot the median, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile of log earnings for men and women
at ages 25, 30, and 35, along with the observed lifecycle trajectories for cohorts that were age 25 in 1985,
1990,..., 2010. The long-term trends for workers ages 30 or 35 largely agree with our earlier results (see
Figure 2), showing that median earnings were stagnant for men and rising for women, while earnings at
the 10th and 90th percentiles rose for both men and women. By contrast, earnings for 25-year-old workers
changed very little over the long term, even falling slightly at the median for both genders.
The early 1990s recession had a devastating impact on the earnings of 25-year-old men and women but
much smaller effects onworkerswhowere 30 years old at the time, although 30-year-olds at the 10th percentile
certainly felt the impacts. Earnings of 35-year-olds at the median and 90th percentile experienced almost no
visible effects on their earnings through any of the Canadian recessions, while the early 2000s downturns and
the Great Recession produced modest earnings reductions for those at the 10th percentile. These results are
generally consistent with the stronger effects of recessions on low-skilled workers documented by Hoynes,
Miller, and Schaller (2012).
Guvenen et al. (2018) document a similar decline in the early 1990s and rise in the late 1990s for median
earnings among 25-year-old men; however, the decline is noticeably more pronounced among 35-year-old
American men compared to Canadian men. Differences between Canadian and American women are more
noteworthy. While 25-year-old Canadian women saw close to 30 log point drops in their median earnings
over the early 1990s, followed by a protracted partial recovery over the next 15 years, young American women
experienced only modest declines in median earnings over the early 1990s, followed by a sharp increase
during the late 1990s and subsequent decline. Median earnings increased slowly and consistently over time
for 35-year-old Canadian women, while they increased sharply over the late 1990s and then remained flat
thereafter for American women. These comparisons highlight the strength of the early 1990s recession in
Canada and tepid recovery over the late 1990s, especially for young Canadian women.
As most economic models predict, the lifecycle profiles plotted in Figure 18 are generally increasing and
concave, especially those at the 90th percentile, which show little disruption due to business cycles. We also

























































































































































(f) 90th percentile (women)
Figure 18: Age and cohort profiles for median, 10th, and 90th percentiles of log(H8,C )
lifecycle profiles are most stark at the bottom of the earnings distribution, where the early 1990s recession,
as well as the Great Recession, led to modest declines in earnings for men from all cohorts. Any lingering
effects on earnings for cohorts that were young during the depths of recessions appear to be modest, at best.
For example, we see fairly rapid log earnings growth over ages 25–30 for the cohort of 25-year-olds in 1995
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compared to the cohort turning age 25 five years earlier or later. The effects of contemporaneous economic
conditions on earnings are clearly dominant.
The implications of these patterns for inequality (as measured by 90–10 percentile differences) across
cohorts (at ages 25, 30, and 35), as well as over the lifecycle for various cohorts, are shown in Figure 19.
Inequality rises quickly during recessions and falls more slowly during booms, whether we follow a given
cohort as they age or look across cohorts at a specific age. Among men, the evolution of inequality over the
lifecycle is driven largely by aggregate economic conditions, while we observe a clear tendency for inequality
to rise over the early part of women’s careers and fall later in their careers.
Figure 20 focuses on inequality at ages 25 and 35 across cohorts, showing 90–50 and 50–10 percentile
differences in addition to the 90–10 difference. As with our earlier findings for the full sample (Figures 4
and 5), the long-run stability of the 90–10 difference reflects an offsetting increase in the 90–50 difference and
decline in the 50–10 difference. The cyclicality of inequality is strongest for younger workers—especially
young men—driven by changes at both the top and bottom of the earnings distribution. Among 35-year-old
men, inequality only increases at the bottom of the earnings distribution during recessions, while inequality
at the top of the distribution is largely immune to the cycle. Inequality among 35-year-old women is also
largely acyclical. It is noteworthy that the early 1990s recession led to greater increases in inequality for men





















































Figure 19: Lifecycle inequality (90–10 percentile differences) in log(H8,C ) across cohorts
Our long time series can help distinguish between cohort differences in lifecycle profiles that are driven
mostly by (sometimes protracted) business cycle effects and longer-term trends. To appreciate this, consider
that Beaudry and Green (2000) exploit SCF data from 1971–1993, while Beach and Finnie (2004) use LAD
tax data from 1982–1999 to study cohort lifecycle profiles. Together, they document an upward shift in
earnings profiles for cohorts entering in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by downward shifts for those entering
in the 1980s and early-1990s. Throughout the 1980s, lifecycle profile shifts remained largely parallel;
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Figure 20: 90–10, 90–50, and 50–10 percentile differences for log(H8,C ) by age and gender
cohorts entering in the 1970s, our profiles are generally consistent with their findings over the 1980s and
1990s. Yet, it is also clear from our analysis that the patterns observed for cohorts entering over the late 1980s
and early 1990s do not represent long-term shifts in earnings profiles. Instead, they reflect the devastating
and drawn-out impacts of the early 1990s recession. Earnings profiles shifted back up in the late 1990s and
changed little for cohorts turning age 25 between 2000 and 2010.
5 The Role of Firm Dynamics
As discussed in the previous section, recessions are associated with large and persistent changes in earnings
dynamics for workers. In Canada’s early 1990s recession, male employment rates fell by roughly 5 percentage
points (see Figure 1). Over that same period, there was a large and persistent decline in earnings across much
of the earnings distribution, coupled with a sharp and sustained increase in the dispersion and (negative)
skewness of earnings growth (see Figures 2, 10, and 12(a)).
Motivated by these observations, we now examine whether similar patterns appear at a more micro
level—within firms. That is, we explore the relationship between firm-level employment dynamics and the
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individual-level earnings dynamics of workers at those firms, breaking down the analysis between workers
who change employers (i.e., movers) and those who remain at the same employer (i.e., stayers). Our empirical
evidence is particularly well-suited to discipline structural models of earnings dynamics that incorporate firm
dynamics. Regarding this point, an active literature studies models of hiring and wage-setting in the labor
market where firms experience stochastic shocks that lead them to grow or shrink over time (e.g., Kaas and
Kircher, 2015; Coles and Mortensen, 2016; Gouin-Bonenfant, 2018; Bilal et al., 2019; Elsby and Gottfries,
2019). However, there is limited evidence—beyond the literature on the wage-productivity pass-through—on
how the earnings of workers correlate with the employment dynamics of their employers.
We first describe the data that we use and then document a number of empirical regularities.
5.1 The matched employer-employee sample: 2001–2016
As discussed in Section 2, the CEEDD links several firm-level administrative data files to the worker-level
T1PMF tax file that we have used thus far. We now briefly describe the four main data sources that we use for
our analysis of worker and firm dynamics. First, we use corporate tax returns (T2), which include financial
information that allows us to construct our measure of firm-level value-added. Second, we use payroll records
(PD7) to obtain our measure of annual employment (i.e., firm size). Third, we use employment records
(ROE) to obtain our measure of layoffs. Finally, we use business register (BR) data to obtain information on
the age and industry of firms. These files are available from 2001 to 2016.
Sample restrictions. We restrict the sample to private sector firms (i.e., all businesses except those in public
administration, education, and health care) that are incorporated and have at least 5 employees. We focus on
incorporated firms in order to have financial information (only corporations file a T2). We focus on firms
with at least 5 employees so that our measure of annual employment growth has a reasonable distribution.36
To construct the matched employer–employee sample, we start from the set of worker–year observations that
satisfy the sample restrictions described in Section 2. We match each of these observations with their “main
employer”, defined as the employer which was the largest source of labor earnings throughout the year.
Table 6 contains summary statistics for the first and last year of the sample, both for our restricted sample,
as well as for the full sample (i.e., all firms and workers). The restricted sample contains roughly 30% of all
firms and roughly 60% of all employees. Firms in the restricted sample tend to be larger, and workers tend
to have higher annual earnings. Moreover, women are under-represented in the restricted sample.
Variable definitions. In all subsequent analysis, we define earnings growth as the change in residual log
annual earnings between year C and C + 1 (i.e., the variable defined as Δ1Y8,C earlier). Note that, while we
match workers to their “main employer”, our measure of annual earnings corresponds to the sum of earnings
from all jobs held throughout the year. We estimate how the mean and dispersion of earnings growth vary
36For example, the addition of one new worker to a one- or two-person firm implies 100% or 50%, respectively, increases in
employment.
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Table 6: Matched sample: summary statistics
Firms Employees
Year Sample Observations Employment Observations Age Annual earnings % Women
2001 Full 758,031 16.27 9,689,005 39.98 52,687 48.54
2001 Restricted 208,203 38.62 6,024,677 39.41 56,044 40.48
2016 Full 866,941 17.48 10,236,659 39.87 57,876 48.99
2016 Restricted 252,569 38.86 6,263,151 39.52 60,407 39.87
Notes: The first part of the table contains firm-level summary statistics: “Observations” refers to the number of firms in each sample; “Employment”
refers to the average firm size (i.e., number of employees per firm). The second half of the table contains employee-level summary statistics:
“Observations” refers to the number of employees in each sample; “Age” and “Annual earnings” are cross-sectional averages in each sample; “%
Women” corresponds to the percentage of women in each sample.
with the size of the employing firm at time C as well as the employment growth rate of the time C employing
firm between years C and C + 1. Firm size is defined as annual employment. We measure annual employment
using payroll records (PD7), which contain monthly data on the number of employees. We average monthly
employment over the course of the year to obtain annual employment. Employment growth is defined as the
change in (log) annual employment between time C and C + 1.
We also disaggregate the analysis by mobility status. In particular, we sort workers into three groups:
stayers (i.e., those who remain at the same main employer between time C and C + 1), non-laid-off movers (i.e.,
those who change their main employer between time C and C + 1 without experiencing a layoff), and laid-off
movers (i.e., those who change their main employer between time C and C + 1 and experience a layoff). We
define a layoff as a permanent separation from a worker’s main employer due to a shortage of work.37 To
determine whether a worker was laid off, we use ROEs filed by the employer. If, in year C or C + 1, a worker
is laid off from his or her (year-C) main employer, then we assign this worker to the group of laid-off movers.
Finally, we explore the link between earnings dynamics and labor productivity growth, defining labor
productivity as nominal value-added per worker (i.e., revenue minus non-labor expenses divided by employ-
ment). We residualize our measure of labor productivity by regressing its logarithm on year and industry
fixed effects. Labor productivity growth is the change in residual (log) labor productivity between time C and
C + 1.
5.2 Empirical facts
We now present four facts regarding the relationship between firm size (which we define as number of
employees), firm growth (which we define as employment growth), and the earnings dynamics of workers.
37Permanent separation means that the worker does not return during the same year or next year. “Shortage of work” includes, for
example, end of contracts/season/school year, shutdown of operations, position eliminated, company restructuring, and bankruptcy.
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Fact #1: Average earnings growth is decreasing in firm size. It is well known that large firms tend
to pay higher wages.38 We now show that there are substantial differences in the average earnings growth
of workers across firm size groups. Figure 21(a) shows that average earnings growth among employees is
weakly decreasing in firm size. The average earnings growth of workers at the smallest firms (i.e., less than
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Figure 21: Average residual earnings growth by firm size groups
We next show that the relationship between earnings growth and firm size is entirely driven by movers
rather than stayers. Figure 21(b) contains average earnings growth by initial firm size group separately for
stayers, non-laid-off movers, and laid-off movers. The average earnings growth of non-laid-off movers at the
smallest firms is roughly 7 log points higher than for non-laid-off movers at the largest firms. For movers
who experience a layoff, the magnitude of the relationship is even stronger, with an average residual earnings
growth differential of roughly 10 log points between the smallest and largest firm size groups. In contrast,
average earnings growth is unrelated to firm size for stayers.
Table 7: Transition probability by firm size groups
Firm size (number of employees)
Mobility status [5, 10) [10, 20) [20, 100) [100, 1000) ≥ 1000
Stayers 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.85
Movers (no layoff) 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.13
Movers (layoff) 0.039 0.038 0.036 0.030 0.016
Notes: Each entry reflects the proportion of each mobility status by firm size.
It is worth noting that the relationship between firm size and the earnings growth of movers is broadly
38See Morissette (1993) for evidence from Canada and Berlingieri, Calligaris, and Criscuolo (2018) for recent cross-country
evidence. In Appendix Figure B1, we document a positive relationship between residual earnings and firm size in our sample.
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consistent with a “job-ladder” view of the labor market (e.g., Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). In job ladder
models, workers “climb up” the job ladder by moving from small, low-wage firms toward large, high-wage
firms. Workers moving out of small firms thus experience, on average, higher wage growth than those
who move out of large firms. Workers who are laid off “fall down” the job ladder, which implies that they
experience larger earnings declines than stayers and voluntary movers. In Appendix B, we show that it is
indeed the case that workers at small firms tend to move to larger firms and vice versa (see Figure B3).
Our results also corroborate findings in the existing literature that displaced workers experience large and
persistent declines in labor earnings (e.g., Davis and von Wachter, 2011).
For completeness, Table 7 reports the fraction of stayers, non-laid-off movers, and laid-off movers by
firm size. The two most notable features are that (i) the vast majority of workers remain at the same employer
from one year to the next (roughly 85%) and (ii) the fraction of laid-off movers is strongly decreasing in firm
size, falling from 3.9% at firms with less than 10 employees to 1.6% at firms with more than 1000 employees.
Fact #2: Earnings growth dispersion is decreasing in firm size. We now move on to studying the
relationship between firm size and the volatility of earnings growth, focusing on log residual earnings
growth dispersion as measured by the 90–10 percentile difference. Figure 22(a) shows that earnings growth
dispersion is strongly decreasing in firm size. To put this into perspective, the roughly 25 log point difference
between earnings growth dispersion of workers at the largest and smallest firms is much greater than the
fluctuations in earnings dispersion over the business cycle as documented in Figure 10. In Appendix
Figure B2, we show that left and right tail dispersion (i.e., the 50–10 and 90–50 percentile differences)
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Figure 22: Residual earnings growth dispersion by firm size groups
Notes: Earnings growth dispersion is defined as the 90–10 difference in residual log earnings growth.
Figure 22(b) disaggregates the results by mobility status. Two patterns stand out. First, the earnings
dispersion of movers (both laid-off and non-laid-off) is much higher than for stayers, irrespective of the
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size of the employer. Focusing on workers at the largest firms (i.e., at least 1000 employees), the earnings
dispersion of movers is 1.85 for those who experience a layoff and 0.91 for those who do not. In comparison,
it is only 0.51 for stayers. Second, earnings dispersion is decreasing with firm size for both stayers and
non-laid-off movers, with a “slope” that is comparable to that of the pooled sample. Comparing workers at
the largest firms to those at the smallest, we see that earnings growth dispersion declines by roughly 20 log
points for stayers and 30 log points for non-laid off movers (similar to the 25 log point decline in the pooled
sample).
Unlike the weak relationship between average earnings growth and firm size, dispersion in earnings
growth is strongly decreasing in firm size for stayers (who account for the vast majority of workers). The
reverse is true for laid-off workers. Altogether, these findings suggest that firm heterogeneity is not only
an important determinant of average earnings growth, but it also affects the dispersion of earnings growth
across workers.
Fact #3: Average earnings growth increases with firm employment growth. While the aggregate growth
rate of employment exhibits some variability over the business cycle, the distribution of employment growth
rates across firms is extremely dispersed (see Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006 for empirical evidence). We now
estimate whether employment growth rates are related to the average earnings growth of workers. To do so,
we first sort firm-year observations by their employment growth rates and then construct 10 employment
growth deciles within year and firm size group.
Figure 23(a) contains the average earnings growth of workers by firm growth deciles. A clear pattern
emerges where earnings growth is strongly increasing in firm growth. For example, workers employed at
firms in the top firm growth decile experience earnings growth that is roughly 15 log points higher than
workers at firms in the bottom firm growth decile. It is worth stressing that these magnitudes are extremely
large. As a point of comparison, the average earnings growth differential by firm size groups was at most 2
log points. A more puzzling finding is the positive relationship between firm growth and earnings growth
for movers (see Figure 23(b)).
One might hypothesize that high-skilled workers and top managers are rewarded more than the average
workers for the growth of the firm, but our results point in the other direction. Figure 23(c) disaggregates the
earnings growth of stayers by their (residualized) permanent earning levels (i.e., the variable defined as Y%C
earlier), sorting workers within each firm into five quintiles based on their permanent earnings. The figure
shows that the relationship between earnings growth and firm growth is systematically stronger for workers
at the lower end of the earnings distribution within firms. For those with the lowest permanent earnings (first
quintile), the earnings growth differential between the top and bottom decile of firm growth is roughly 20
log points, compared to only 10 log points for workers with the highest permanent earnings (fifth quintile).
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Figure 23: Average earnings growth by employment growth groups
Notes: Panel (c) restricts the sample to firms with at least 10 observed workers, while panel (d) restricts the sample to firms with at least 100 observed
workers.
distribution within firms.39 Finally, Figures 23(e) and 23(f) break down the relationship between earnings
39When conditioning on workers in different permanent earnings quintiles (Figure 23(c)), we consider workers from firms with at
least 10 observed employees. When conditioning on top permanent earnings percentiles (Figure 23(d)), we consider workers from
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Figure 24: Average earnings growth by labor productivity growth and employment growth groups
growth (for stayers) and firm growth by initial firm size and firm age, respectively. Our main finding is
robust, with a slightly stronger relationship for small firms.
The relationship that we uncover between earnings growth and firm employment growth is reminiscent
of the finding that there is a positive (yet incomplete) pass-through of firm productivity to wages (e.g., Guiso,
Pistaferri, and Schivardi, 2005). If employment growth were fully determined by productivity growth, then
our results would merely be a restatement of the existence of a wage-productivity pass-through. In practice,
there is considerable heterogeneity in productivity growth rates conditional on employment growth, which
allows us to examine the relative effect of productivity growth versus employment growth on earnings.
For simplicity, we construct three employment growth groups: “low employment growth” reflects firms
in the bottom 3 deciles of employment growth, “middle employment growth” reflects the middle 4 deciles,
and “high employment growth” reflects the top 3 deciles. As we can see in Figure 23(a), the “middle
employment growth” group contains firms with stable employment (growth generally less than 10% annually
in absolute value), while the two other groups contain firms with very rapid employment growth or sizeable
employment losses. Within each of these groups, we sort firms into 10 deciles of labor productivity growth.
Figure 24(a) plots the average earnings growth of workers (stayers only) by labor productivity growth
decile for each of the three employment growth groups. Two patterns stand out. First, average earnings
growth is increasing in labor productivity growth. For example, in the “middle employment growth” group,
workers at firms in the top decile of labor productivity growth experience average earnings growth of
roughly 5.5 log points higher than those at firms in the bottom decile. This is consistent with an imperfect
pass-through of productivity to wages, as the previous literature has documented.40 Second, the effect of
employment growth on average earnings growth is large, even conditional on labor productivity growth. For
instance, among workers in the bottom decile of labor productivity growth, workers in “high employment
40Note, however, that our measure of firm productivity (i.e., value added per worker in revenue terms) is different from other
productivity measures sometimes used, such as total factor productivity. For instance, a change in (revenue) labor productivity can
be due to an increase in the capital stock per worker or a change in the price markup.
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growth” firms experience average earnings growth that is about 13 log points higher than workers in “low
employment growth” firms.
The importance of firm employment growth is even more clear in Figure 24(b). Here, we construct three
labor productivity growth groups, defining “low productivity growth” as firms in the bottom 3 deciles of
productivity growth, “middle productivity growth” as firms in the middle 4 deciles, and “high productivity
growth” as firms in the top 3 deciles. Figure 24(b) plots the average earnings growth of workers (stayers
only) by employment growth decile for each of the three labor productivity growth groups. Again, we see
that average earnings growth is increasing for workers in firms with high employment growth (i.e., fact #3)
even when controlling for labor productivity growth. Moreover, the gradient between earnings growth and
employment growth is much steeper than that between earnings growth and labor productivity growth.
So far, our analysis has focused on workers for whom we can observe both firm growth and earnings
growth. As a result, we have excluded workers whose employer exits between time C and C + 1. In Appendix
B we repeat the analysis by including those observations. We obtain results that are coherent with what we
have found thus far. In particular, Figure B4(b) shows that movers out of exiting firms experience an average
earnings growth comparable to that of movers out of rapidly shrinking firms (i.e., first decile of employment
growth).
Overall, our analysis indicates that the earnings trajectory of workers is tightly linked to the employ-
ment growth of their employing firms. Workers who join high-growth firms experience above-average
earnings growth, while those who join rapidly shrinking firms experience below-average earnings growth.
Furthermore, the relationship between employment growth appears to be even stronger than that for labor
productivity growth. One caveat is that our measure of labor productivity growth may be “noisier” than our
measure of employment growth, which would lead to a greater measurement error attenuation bias for the
productivity growth – earnings growth relationship.
Fact #4: Earnings growth dispersion is a U-shaped function of firm employment growth. We now turn
to the relationship between earnings growth dispersion and firm employment growth. Figure 25(a) shows that
earnings growth dispersion (i.e., 90–10 difference for residual log earnings growth) is a U-shaped function of
firm employment growth. Workers at rapidly shrinking and at fast-growing firms face considerable dispersion
in their earnings growth, while workers at firms with stable employment experience much less dispersion in
their earnings growth. Inspecting the relationship by mobility group, we find that the U-shaped relationship
is entirely driven by stayers (see Figure 25(b)). In contrast, the earnings growth dispersion of movers appears
to be increasing in firm employment growth.
We next decompose the earnings growth dispersion for stayers into left-tail dispersion (i.e., the 50–
10 difference) and right-tail dispersion (i.e., the 90–50 difference). This reveals opposing “hockey stick”
patterns, where workers at low-growth firms face a high level of left-tail dispersion while workers at high-
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Figure 25: Residual earnings growth dispersion by employment growth groups
Notes: Earnings growth dispersion is defined as the 90–10 difference in residual log earnings growth.
the idea that downside risk increases when firms contract, while upside risk increases when firms expand
employment. These patterns are consistent with the macro relationship between aggregate employment and
earnings dispersion first documented in Guvenen, Ozkan, and Song (2014). In particular, expansions are
characterized by an increase in right-tail dispersion (upside risk), while recessions are characterized by an
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increase in left-tail dispersion (downside risk).
Next, we disaggregate the analysis (for stayers) by sorting workers into permanent earnings quintiles.
We see that the U-shaped relationship holds within each quintile (see Figure 25(d)), where the two lowest
earnings quintiles (especially the lowest) experience a much higher level of earnings growth dispersion than
the other three quintiles. Finally, in Figures 25(e) and 25(f), we repeat the analysis by sorting workers into
firm size and firm age groups. Our main result is robust: the earnings growth dispersion of stayers is a
U-shaped function of firm growth (with dispersion especially high for stayers at sharply contracting firms).
As we did for fact #3, we repeat the analysis by including exiting firms and obtain coherent results (see
Figure B5 in Appendix B).
Altogether, our findings demonstrate that workers who join fast-growing firms can expect not only faster
earnings growth on average, but their earnings growth distribution will be more positively skewed with very
limited downside risk. By contrast, workers at rapidly shrinking firms experience low average earnings
growth with little upside risk and a negatively skewed distribution. Finally, workers joining firms with stable
employment typically experience moderate earnings growth and little dispersion.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides a comprehensive examination of earnings inequality, volatility, and mobility in Canada
from 1983 to 2016. Further, starting in 2001, we use Canadian matched employer–employee data to explore
the joint dynamics of workers and firms. Our most novel contribution with these data is our analysis of the
relationship between the earnings growth of workers and the employment growth of their employers.
Our first main finding sets Canada apart from many other countries (especially the U.S.): we find only
modest changes in most measures of overall earnings inequality, volatility, and mobility between 1983 and
2016. For example, the 90–10 male earnings ratio grew far less in Canada than it did in the U.S., while
the ratio actually declined slightly for Canadian women. Underlying this stability, we find that the 90–50
earnings ratio increased slowly but consistently over time; however, this was largely offset by reductions
in the 50–10 ratio. This apparent stability hides a few notable trends, however, including a nearly 30%
increase in earnings of women relative to men (at the median) and a meteoric rise in earnings among those
at the very top of the earnings distribution. Meanwhile, earnings volatility (as measured by 90–10, 90–50,
or 50–10 ratios for annual earnings growth) declined only slightly over the lengthy period we study, while
transition matrices of 5- and 10-year mobility showed reduced persistence in the middle of the distribution
(with slightly more downward mobility) coupled with sustained persistence in the tails.
Second, despite the relative stability of earnings inequality and volatility over the long term, we document
substantial movements over the business cycle. Sharp (temporary) increases in earnings inequality and
volatility, driven mainly by significant earnings losses for younger workers and men at the bottom of the
earnings distribution, occurred during both the early 1990s recession and the Great Recession. Those at
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the very top of the earnings distribution (i.e., top 1%) also experienced heavy losses during these economic
downturns. These strong cyclical patterns are similar to those documented in the U.S. (e.g., Bloom et al.,
2017; Guvenen et al., 2018).
It is natural to ask how Canada avoided the substantial increases inequality (except at the very top)
experienced in the U.S. and many other developed countries. Noting sizeable increases in the returns
to schooling, many studies point to (skill-biased) technological change as an important factor in rising
inequality around the world. Although the Canadian tax files do not contain information about education,
previous studies have shown that returns to schooling increased much less in Canada than in the U.S. (e.g.,
Boudarbat, Lemieux, and Riddell, 2010; Bowlus, Liu, and Robinson, 2019). Observing better labor market
performance among less-educated older workers in Canada relative to the U.S., Bowlus, Liu, and Robinson
(2019) conjecture that this may be the result of higher Canadian unionization rates and growth in public
sector employment protecting these workers from wage reductions. Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2004)
further suggest that weaker union declines in Canada (relative to the U.S. and U.K.) may partially explain
its more modest increases in inequality over the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, we note that the earnings of
less-skilled workers in Canada have been bolstered by more regular increases in provincial minimum wages,
a sizable resource sector, and strengthened work incentives in social assistance programs that are not limited
to single mothers (as in the U.S.).
Over this same period, Canada has experienced a more modest increase in earnings over the upper part of
the distribution (except at the very top) compared to the U.S. Two supply-based changes have been identified
here. First, Fortin et al. (2012) argue that the returns to higher education rose less in Canada due to faster
growth in post-secondary enrolment. Second, Aydemir and Borjas (2007) estimate that Canada’s focus on
admitting high-skilled immigrants dampened its university earnings premium, while greater numbers of
low-skilled immigrants led to an increase in the U.S. premium. Yet, these forces did little to hold back the
top 1% in Canada, who experienced dramatic increases in earnings comparable to those observed in the U.S.
The reasons for this are not yet understood, but Saez and Veall (2005) speculate that it may be due to the
tightly integrated labor market for highly skilled workers.
Our second finding highlights the devastating losses experienced by many Canadian workers (especially
younger workers) during major economic downturns. Based on aggregate employment and output, as well
as earnings inequality and volatility, the early 1990s recession had much larger effects than other recessions,
including the Great Recession, which was much deeper and longer lasting in the U.S. Although the American
and Canadian economies are tied through trade, tourism, and labor flows, it is clear that important differences
in sectoral composition and economic policies have resulted in heterogeneous responses to shared economic
disruptions. Much work is still needed to better understand these differences.
Our analysis of firm and worker dynamics reveals a third important finding. Workers at fast-growing
firms experience faster earnings growth and less downside risk than workers at rapidly shrinking firms, who
experience low (or negative) average earnings growth and little upside risk. Further, workers at firms with
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stable employment typically experience moderate earnings growth with little upside or downside risk. The
strong positive relationship between earnings growth and firm employment growth exists across firms of
different sizes and ages, as well as across workers with different levels of recent earnings. The latter suggests
that workers across the firm skill distribution (or firm hierarchy) share in the benefits of expansion.
Our findings on worker earnings and firm employment dynamics deepen our understanding of the sources
of individual earnings growth and idiosyncratic earnings risk. Employers play an important role in shaping
the earnings trajectories of their workers, not just their earnings levels. But, the extent to which idiosyncratic
earnings risk is explained by the risks faced by firms remains an open question. Layoffs are an important
source of downside risk, while changing employers voluntarily presents an opportunity for upward mobility.
Considerable cross-sectional variation in individual earnings risk across the firm growth distribution suggests
that cyclical fluctuations in the firm growth distribution could be an important source of variation in individual
earnings risk over the business cycle.
Of course, the empirical relationship between earnings dynamics and firm dynamics need not reflect a
causal relationship. Even so, our findings can help in identifying and disciplining economic mechanisms
important for the joint dynamics of firms and their workers. For example, the fact that firm growth is still
correlated with earnings growth even after workers leave the firmmay indicate that high-growth firms tend to
hire high-growth workers. The fact that earnings growth is more strongly correlated with firm employment
growth than productivity growth may suggest that firms must pay more when they want to expand their
workforce; however, they may choose not to adjust employment immediately in response to productivity
shocks. We leave a more in-depth treatment of these issues for future research.
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